

Ray Jordan

**JOHN B. STETSON UNIVERSITY
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SOME FUNDAMENTAL VALUES

BY

Warren Stone Gordis

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FOREWORD

The studies presented here are by Warren Stone Gordis, Professor of English in John B. Stetson University. Some of them were read before the Athenian Club, an organization of DeLand men which meets regularly for social fellowship and the discussion of themes of common interest. The first paper, "Catgut and Music," was published in the Contributor's Column of the *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1928. For permission to reprint it here I wish to thank the editor of that periodical. "The New Humanism as an Intellectual Barometer" was read before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Central Florida, February 20, 1931. The range of these papers, representative of Professor Gordis's ability as a scholar, is indicative of the comprehensiveness of his taste and the scope of his powers of appreciation and criticism. In publishing them, John B. Stetson University records its homage and gratitude to Professor Gordis for his long and useful service.

Charles G. Smith, Editor

DeLand, Florida
October 15, 1936

CATGUT AND MUSIC¹

Last Monday evening an audience that packed the opera house was profoundly moved. Kreisler, as few can, interpreted on a rare old violin some of Chopin's most exquisite music, and when at the close of the performance two prominent and beautiful young women presented the artist with baskets of lilies and roses respectively, such an ovation followed as has seldom been seen in our city.

The following evening, however, at a session of the Modern Truth Association, now meeting in this city, the celebrated Dr. Bunk presented considerations which among thinking people have created a decided stir.

The learned man called attention to the fact that the sounds that had so moved the audience arose simply from the vibrations of catgut, that the cat is a relatively inconsequential animal, that a dead cat is even less significant than a living one, and finally that the gut of the cat is the most unromantic portion of the feline anatomy; even the nocturnal vibrations of the vocal cords of the living cat have not usually awakened rapturous emotions on the part of the listeners. In view of these undoubted truths the emotional reaction of the audience Monday evening was shown to be highly irrational.

Nor was this all. Investigations showed that the lilies and roses, the offering of which occasioned the climax of enthusiasm, had come from a florist who had produced them from the unmentionable by-product of his neighbor's cow stable; they were, therefore, merely sublimated—supply whatever disgusting word you find appropriate. Here we have the pitiable and humiliating spectacle of a presumably intelligent and cultivated audience going into raptures over sublimated catgut and sublimated—fertilizer. What the lecturer said about the charm of the young ladies who presented the flowers we have not space to report.

True, there were some who modestly took issue with Dr. Bunk. They did not deny that catgut was an element, and perhaps a necessary element, in Kreisler's performance, but they urged the pres-

(1) Suggested by the writer's attending a concert immediately after reading one of Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch's Modern Temper articles.

ence of other and more significant elements—elements of an entirely different nature. They spoke of the artistic inspiration of Chopin, of the succession of skillful artisans that had made the violin possible, and finally of the musical genius of Kreisler, which they thought was something more than sublimated beefsteak. They considered the lilies and roses in a somewhat similar light, saying something about their essential beauty as a mysterious gift of nature, not yet exhaustively explained, and about the human patience and skill devoted to the improvement of varieties and the production of the given specimens. Some even ventured to suggest that Dr. Bunk's analysis was sublimated nonsense.

Discerning ones, however, had a definite suspicion that these protestants were Victorians, even Mid-Victorians in spirit—a suspicion that became almost a certainty when on several occasions the words “spiritual” and “divine” inadvertently were allowed to escape. They evidently were suffering from those strange “taboos” and “inhibitions” which are known to infest Mid-Victorians, and to which they sometimes give the absurd and high-sounding names of esthetic, moral, and religious principles. Of course there were anticipations of Victorianism before the reign of the “smug” and “stuffy” queen from whose name and age the movement is labeled; Socrates, Plato, Kant, and even Jesus belonged essentially to the tribe—a tribe that, as everyone now realizes, is rapidly on the way to extinction, thanks to the victorious principle of Modern Disillusionment.

As Dr. Bunk's analysis of the situation has been telegraphed throughout the country, and even throughout the civilized world, musicians and florists, and lovers of music and flowers, have been filled with consternation and distress. Disillusionment has shown them that they were really devotees to catgut and stable manure. Many suicides have already been announced; but it is to be hoped that the survivors will, in general, try to reconcile themselves to the gloomy days stretching out before them, realizing that nothing is quite so precious as truth and stark reality.

THE MODERN TEMPER

Henry Drummond, who was at once a great scientist and a great Christian, published a book entitled *The Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. What he really did was not to establish identity between the laws of the two domains, but rather to point out interesting analogies. In our times there is a general movement among a very influential body of thinkers to establish an absolute continuity between the world of experimentation, on the one hand, and what used to be considered the "Spiritual World," on the other. The results in some cases are simply devastating for what have been regarded as spiritual values.

Darwin and succeeding biologists have often been regarded as the fathers of this tendency. It has seemed to me that those really responsible were Spencer and his successors who have attempted to construct on the foundation of physical science a universal philosophy of reality. The key assumption is that there is absolute continuity between the realms of physics, biology, and personality—that the same laws in the same manner apply to the several realms. The assumption is that everything in the more complex, and what we have regarded the higher, realm of personality can be exhaustively explained by elements which we find obviously present in the physical and the biological.

In this connection I have been interested in the positions of Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch, presented first in a series of articles in the *Atlantic Monthly* and recently in a volume entitled *The Modern Temper*, which has attracted wide attention.

Mr. Krutch is a gentleman of considerable distinction in the literary world—author of a book analyzing the personality of Poe, and of many critical articles, and a member of the jury of the Literary Guild of America.

Mr. Krutch unreservedly accepts the doctrine of continuity, to which I have referred. What is more significant is that he remorselessly works out what to him seem the logical consequences of that assumption when applied to human values. He assumes that for intelligent and thinking men there is practical and necessary agreement.

It is a closed case. But unlike many advocates of mechanism, Mr. Krutch is not at all happy about the situation. Practically all distinctively human values prove to be based on illusion, and so, for the modern man, vanish away. Romance, Art, Religion, and Philosophy, result from the struggles of an unfortunate animal to conceal from himself the fact that of all animals he is least adapted to the universe in which he finds himself. The Modern Temper is one of despair.

Perhaps some may say that such an attitude is altogether exceptional—that no considerable body of intelligent people accept any such point of view. Look at the incidental characterization of the present age given in an article in a recent number of the *English Journal*, on the teaching of Tennyson and Browning. These are the author's words: ". . . today when love is but a biological urge, immortality an old-fashioned sentimentalism, good and evil only such because we think them so, and God an outworn superstition of childish minds" In view of this incidental assumption of a professor in the State Teachers' College of Buffalo, perhaps Mr. Krutch, in calling his position *the modern temper*, is not so presumptuous as might appear—although one writer has neatly said it should rather be called *a modern distemper*.

No, these underlying assumptions are very general, as is obvious to anyone familiar with contemporary books and magazines. Mr. Krutch has performed a real service in showing to what appalling conclusions one may be led by assuming this doctrine—dogma we might call it—of continuity, assuming that if some simple biological element enters into human experience, this and like discoverable elements give an exhaustive account of all that is real and significant in the experience.

It may now be of interest to glance at the successive chapters of Mr. Krutch's book.

A disarmingly modest introduction disclaims what might seem the presumption of the title *The Modern Temper*. The book is a confession, presenting what to the author seem the logical results of a temper distinctively modern.

The first chapter, the "Genesis of the Mood," develops the point of view which we have noticed. The race, like the child, has discovered the antithesis of the world of illusion and that of nature. "The world of poetry, mythology, and religion represents the world as a man would like to have it, while science represents the world as he gradually comes to discover it." Only gradually do men

come practically to realize that their most cherished values rest on illusions. The conclusion is that "there impends for the human spirit either extinction or a readjustment more stupendous than any made before."

In the "Paradox of Humanism" we are told that humanism involves two absolutely irreconcilable ends: the sort of social adjustment that is most perfectly realized in the animal world, for instance in the communities of ants and bees, and on the other hand a development and satisfaction of the individual which is anti-social and utterly hostile to nature. Civilization leads to decadence, while the ant's articulation with nature enables him to persist through the ages. "Yet what man," exclaims the author, "would be an ant?"

"The Disillusion of the Laboratory" shows that the optimism of a Huxley, who held that Science was a sort of New Messiah that would establish upon a firmer basis than ever the distinctively human values, has passed away; and man has been shown to be an unhappy ill-adjusted animal standing alone in a hostile universe.

"Love—or the Life and Death of a Value," applies the foregoing principles to romantic and conjugal love as a human experience. As no results of introspective experience have validity any longer, it is irrational to recognize in love anything besides that animal sexuality which may be observed in the laboratory; and when we come to realize that fact, the whole experience sinks to a purely biological level—romantic love as a value is dead.

In "The Tragic Fallacy" we are shown that tragedy as a form of literature gets its significance from the contrast between what is assumed to be the inherent dignity of man and the wreck of that potential greatness. Tragedy thus rests upon a fundamental fallacy, and as man comes to realize his situation he loses—or will lose—his power to produce or appreciate tragedy, and another value passes. The eloquent presentations of the nobility of the human personality expressed in the *Psalms*, in Sophocles, and in Shakespeare, become meaningless twaddle. Therefore, exit tragedy.

The author now turns to what he considers attempts to escape from the plight in which the modern man finds himself. In "Life, Art, and Peace" we have an examination of the attempt to interpret life as an art. Havelock Ellis in the *Dance of Life* may seem to construct a valid world, on the basis of our emotions, but this world is not articulated with the world of nature. The artist creates his own

little individual imaginative world, and amuses himself and perhaps others by making believe it is the real world.

Here is no recognition of the idea, held by many, that the esthetic experience is a genuine and complementary means of apprehending reality—that the sense of beauty gives us actual contact with aspects of reality inaccessible to physical science.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is that on "The Phantom of Certitude." Here the author recognizes that there is a renewed effort to gain certainty in the domain of personality through metaphysics. He recognizes that there is increasing dissatisfaction with the philosophy based exclusively on physical science—that to the disillusioned modern, life is not "one tenth as luminous as it was to those who felt themselves playing an important part in the cosmic struggle,"—that Freudianism "is the most far-reaching of any of the recent attempts to rob man of such shreds of dignity as had been left him." Of course Mr. Krutch has no respect for any philosophy resting on experience outside the laboratory, but he is honest enough to note that philosophy is making various energetic efforts to help man escape from the blind alley into which he is being forced. The metaphysics of Hulm, the so-called Gestalt psychology, emergent evolution, and the *quantum* theory are considered. He recognizes that the essential likeness of these movements is the denial of the dogma of continuity, and the conviction that there are different levels of truth which are to be apprehended by different methods; that is, there is a widespread tendency to deny the fundamental assumption lying at the basis of the whole so-called modern temper. The author seems to assume that to question absolute continuity is to claim absolute discontinuity between the several fields, but why need this be the case? Why may we not strive toward a philosophy that will bring into a synthesis the entire experience of human personality, giving full weight to the experience of the laboratory where it is relevant, while recognizing the validity of other elements of experience which may be evaluated and interpreted only through esthetic, rational, and religious insight? It is by no means certain that such a philosophy would be "the art of being sure of something that is not so."

At any rate, our author feels that in the absence of some such philosophy our task is to find such peace as we may in a world of "unresolvable discord." The last sentence of the book embodies an interesting combination of pessimism and optimism. "Ours is a lost

cause, and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not for all that, sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals."

How shall we account for what is being called *the modern temper*, and what should be our attitude as thinking men toward the problems that it raises?

It is a commonplace that an individual, an epoch, or a race may have the defects of its qualities. It is a conspicuous fact that the past two generations have witnessed epoch-making achievements. By no means the least of these is the recognition and application of the historical or genetic method. We have found that in countless cases our understanding of what a complex phenomenon is, is furthered by examining how it came to be. How general and how fruitful this method has been may be illustrated by referring to any library catalogue and observing how many titles begin with "Development of" or "Evolution of." In trying to understand the present status of any complicated phenomenon we cannot afford to neglect any available data as to its antecedents. The very triumphs of the method tempt one to overstep its proper limits. We are all familiar with the proverbial small boy with a new jack-knife. The implement is applied in season and out of season, often to the damage of the family furniture. Likewise it is not strange that the enthusiastic and successful user of the genetic method should be reluctant to admit that it has any limitations—should try to express musical values in terms of vibrating strings and conjugal love in terms of animal sexuality.

The tremendous practical achievements of applied science in giving man control of nature has further tended to enhance the prestige of the methods of the laboratory. The practitioner of these methods, properly, while working on his problem limits himself to the data that are amenable to the methods. From properly ignoring, it is a natural step to deny the existence of any other elements.

Life presents many parallels to obsessions of this sort. The excesses and absurdities of the new 'rich have for ages been the subject of satire. Anyone who has followed the history of pedagogy or medicine has observed how a whole profession has again and again been carried off its feet by some new movement, which, while having permanent value, has for a time obscured other values. Our age has in the genetic method and in physical science a marvelous new jack-knife, good for many kinds of whittling; and the small boy has not by any

means learned its limitations.

Not only is our age carried away with its enthusiasm for a new tool, but it is flattered by comparing favorably its own achievements with those of past generations. In this respect periods are like nations and races. To the Greeks all others were barbarians. The provincial American thanks God—if he believes in God—that he is not like unto the people of other nations. The advocate of some new departure in educational methods is very reluctant to admit that any really valuable work was done by his predecessors. This natural and understandable human tendency leads many prominent spokesmen for our age to disparage, ignore, or practically deny values that their predecessors recognized.

These considerations, I believe, help to explain how men of the Modern Temper come to ignore and deny the distinctive values of our individual personalities, the one form of reality of which we have direct knowledge. Obsessed with our progress in understanding the inorganic and the biological, they assume that in them is a complete and exhaustive explanation of all that is real in human experience. All else is illusion. How, by the way, can we be certain that physical science and mechanical determinism are not also illusions?

To refute mechanistic determinism, the doctrine of complete continuity of the physical and the personal, is the task for a volume by a philosopher. Streeter, in his book *Reality*, has given a good example of how to proceed. We may have time for a single consideration.

We have in recent years heard much of pragmatism. The term has had various applications. To some, workableness has seemed the essential defining quality of truth. *True*, to them, means *workable*. Two contradictory propositions, if equally *workable* would to them be equally *true*. To others, *workableness* is rather a *test* of truth. Assuming that the universe is in any sense a consistent system—and without some such consistency science would be impossible—that which is consistent with the system should in general and in the long run be workable. Then workableness would be a criterion of truth, conceived of as conformity with reality.

Now how does mechanism, as applied to human personality meet this criterion?

Creationist and evolutionist alike have regarded the human mind as the highest term in nature. Even Mr. Krutch says we should rather die as men than live as animals, even animals as well adjusted

to nature as are ants. Through centuries of experience master minds in response to the phenomena about them—physical, social, intellectual, and spiritual—have wrought out certain conceptions and institutions, with all sorts of practical applications and adjustments. Our moral, social, and political institutions, which have proved reasonably workable, rest on the assumption of personal self-determination. The values that have made life noble and desirable rest on a recognition of the meaningfulness of human personality.

Now here is presented a rival assumption, which, as its advocates admit, would dissipate the whole existing structure with its very foundations, without putting any equivalent in its place. Talk about a bull in a china shop! That beast is a veritable lamb compared with the Krutch philosophy when let loose upon all that is most practical and precious in human relationships. Does not pragmatism support the constructive rather than the destructive elements in life? Is it reasonable that an assumption that would reduce mind to bankruptcy is its supreme achievement in truth?

Mr. Krutch in his volume has rendered a valuable service in remorselessly plotting the goal of mechanistic determinism as applied to human personality. The logicians used to talk of refuting an assumption by *reductio ad absurdum*. Were it not for such manifest evidence of Mr. Krutch's seriousness, we might almost suspect him of slyly designing to perpetrate upon the Modern Temper a magnificent hoax similar to Defoe's *The Shortest Way with Dissenters* or Swift's *A Modest Proposal*.

But, of course, man will recover from his mechanistic spree. He will see that there is no necessary connection between genuine physical science and the old Lucretian philosophy that is trying to ride in on the back of vigorous young science. There may be tragedy for individual youths, who, desiring to be up-to-date, may fancy that the philosophy of futility has come to stay. There may be more college suicides. By the way, Lucretius' traditional death by suicide would have been quite logical without the assumption of the love philter. Tennyson was right when he said:

Not only cunning casts in clay;
 Let Science prove we are, and then
 What matters Science unto men,
 At least to me? I would not stay.

No, the achievements of the human spirit are too well grounded. The values that have been wrought out in, and recognized by, human personality are too real and obvious to suffer permanent eclipse. The mechanists all too glibly assume that they are the people and that wisdom will die with them. Even now, able thinkers, thoroughly familiar with the results of modern science, and in entire sympathy with its processes where applicable, are maintaining the claims of spirit; and their number will increase as men gain a truer perspective.

From the vantage ground of that truer perspective, men will smile, but with indulgent comprehension, at some of the distorted estimates of today. The real achievements of our time will be articulated with the spiritual heritage of the ages. The task of the philosopher will be to effect a synthesis of the new and the old, eliminating the dross from both, and illuminating the abiding values of both.

THE NEW HUMANISM AS AN INTELLECTUAL BAROMETER

Readers of our serious periodicals during the early thirties frequently met the term Humanism. The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature in 1929 and 1930 listed nearly sixty articles under that heading. The volume covering the four preceding years, 1925-1928, so listed about one article a year. This strikingly indicates the rapidity with which this topic came into prominence. The reader further observes that the discussions in question are largely concerned with ideas that Messrs. Babbitt and More have been expressing for many years. Why, then, one naturally asks, did these ideas, long before the public, so suddenly become the object of such vivid interest? One may refer to the volume, *Humanism and America*, edited by Professor Foerster, and the activities of the editor of the *Bookman*, in explanation of the situation. But must we not go further back than this? Professor Foerster is but one contributor to this symposium. How has it happened that this group of men of evidently different specific interests have just at this time begun to advocate, or at least to treat sympathetically, this New Humanism? And why, in view of the relative apathy with which the books of Messrs. More and Babbitt have in the past been received by the reading public, did such a furor, *pro* and *con* over them so suddenly arise? It seems reasonable that such an effect has a cause, and one is curious, if possible, to discover that cause.

May it not be that there is some quality in the recent intellectual atmosphere—weather if you please—that makes the thinking public exceptionally susceptible to the humanistic suggestions? If so, the movement may be a sort of intellectual barometer, indicating the present general state of mind; and possibly like other barometers, affording data for forecasting the intellectual weather of the immediate future.

Let us examine the situation. Not long ago considerable attention was attracted by articles by Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch, published in the *Atlantic Monthly*, and later embodied in the volume, *The Modern Temper*. This volume was, we may believe, significant, not merely as

an isolated phenomenon, but rather as the expression of an attitude somewhat common among present-day intellectuals. Mr. Krutch perhaps went too far in using the term "the modern temper." The reviewer who suggested as a substitute "a modern distemper" came nearer the facts.

This modern temper, or distemper, is no sudden growth. Ever since the time of Spencer and Huxley there has been percolating down through the various intellectual strata a naturalistic, physical, mechanical view of man. This is not so much the direct result of Darwinism as of a philosophy which has made use of the Darwinian hypothesis. The fundamental assumption has been that everything that is necessary for the exhaustive explanation of the more complex and higher phenomena is to be found in the simpler and lower forms; that there is such a continuity between the different levels of being, physico-chemical, biological, and personal, that one is not justified in holding that the higher contains anything essentially different from what is obviously in the lower. One is not by these theorists permitted to apply the principle of continuity from the *higher* down toward the *lower*, saying that the higher may be *potentially* though not *obviously* and *demonstrably* present in the lower.

This general impression has been reenforced in various ways. The tremendous progress and practical achievement of the physical sciences have led to the feeling that the methods of the physical sciences constitute a universal solvent for all the problems of existence. The discovery of the vastness of the physical universe in comparison with the earth promotes the impression of the cosmic insignificance of the human race, and still more of the individual man. Many of the investigations and speculations of contemporary psychology have tended in the same direction. From an interesting and significant study of the objective manifestations and conditions of human thinking, feeling, and willing, or of what has been considered thinking, feeling, and willing, there has been a tendency on the part of many to assume that human experience essentially is nothing else than the sum of reactions between the physical organism and its environment; that there is no "separate self," that freedom is an illusion. The course of reasoning seems to be something like this. Only certain objective phenomena of what used to be called mind are susceptible of scientific treatment. Psychology *as a science* can take account of only such phenomena. The psychologist *as scientist* is justified in ignoring any

other elements. Then comes the big *non sequitur*: therefore we are justified in holding that nothing else exists. All that we have known about the self from within, all those ideas of freedom that form the basis of moral and legal responsibility go by the board.

Nor is this all. Freudian psychology, understood or misunderstood, is permeating the popular consciousness. People are hearing that the normal and wholesome thing is to follow their fundamental impulses, presumably their animal impulses. Repressions are very dangerous. Puritanism was a pernicious disease.

All these tendencies that have been working for two generations have of late, in the opinion of many, reached their natural goal, and the significance of Mr. Krutch's *The Modern Temper* is that it gives a clear, cold, logical account of that goal. Cosmically man is an insignificant, ill adjusted animal in a hostile universe. All ideas of man's nobility and significance are illusions. All distinctive human values in the cold light of modern knowledge are dissipated. We have a philosophy of futility and despair.

Now some may say that all this is the speculation of a few hair-brained theorists and that it has no meaning to the mass of mankind. The mass of mankind to be sure are not familiar with the abstract or scientific form of the doctrines. But these theories are being expounded in books and articles having no mean circulation. Then with more or less understanding they are assimilated by a host of popular writers. Practically all of what we have regarded our high class magazines contain such articles. Much of the fiction being produced by writers of the highest literary rating to a greater or less extent assume the views which we have just been formulating. Thus, as we have said, these views of human nature and human activity are percolating through the various intellectual strata of our population. The very formlessness of many of our novels is attributed to the conviction that life is formless and that art should be true to life. The obsession of many of our prominent novelists with the gross details of sexual experience has been explained as due to the prevailing uncertainty of what in the past have been regarded as human values. In the field of elemental animal impulse, the authors have felt that they were on a secure basis of reality.

A study of the history of various movements, political, sociological, intellectual, and literary, shows a tendency to oscillate between extremes of freedom and restraint. We recognize that, particularly in

the case of literature, even before the World War the protest against regularity and conformity was well under way, and that by the War this tendency was greatly accelerated.

Now how about this New Humanist movement? I said at the outset that Messrs. Babbitt and More had for years been proclaiming their doctrine of classical restraint versus romantic freedom. They were almost voices crying in the wilderness so far as creating any particular excitement. And now this volume entitled *Humanism and America*, a symposium in which fifteen contributors from various points of view advocate the gospel of More and Babbitt, has created the greatest furor that the critical camp has known for decades.

If we examine the principles on which the New Humanism is based, we shall see that many of them are diametrically opposed to those underlying the tendencies leading to *The Modern Temper*.

One of the principles of the Babbitt-More party is that of the two laws, one for man and one for thing. This is in direct contradiction to the entire continuity doctrine. It maintains that the uniformities which physical science has formulated for physical phenomena do not exhaustively apply on the plane of personality. Free will is uniformly maintained by the New Humanists. Messrs. Babbitt and More base this conviction of the freedom of the will directly upon intuition.

The New Humanists recognize a higher and a lower self. There is a tendency to connect the lower self with the emotions and the higher self or higher will with the intellect. The timeliness of this position is its opposition to the emphasis on the authority of the natural impulses, marking a reaction against the exaltation of unregulated emotion; at the same time it has exposed its advocates to vigorous criticism in the interest of literary inspiration, on the ground that they are hostile to that intensity, even violence, of emotion or passion behind much that has been recognized as greatest in literature.

Closely connected with the distinction between the higher and the lower self is the idea of the inner check. The free personality intuitively recognizes a higher and a lower in its domain, and in the exercise of its prerogative exercises discipline over the lower in the interest of the higher.

The fact that the assertion of such old fashioned ideas has awakened such an amount of support from young independent thinkers who are not actuated by any particular theological animus; and, a

circumstance quite as significant, the fact that this assertion has been considered important enough to call forth so numerous, vigorous, and even virulent rejoinders seems to be evidence that the forces of spiritual anarchy that have been threatening the very foundations of our ethical and religious thinking have about reached the limit of their advance, and that the counter movement has begun.

But this is supposed to be a movement in literary criticism; in regard to literary art Messrs. Babbitt and More have for a long time been advocating the quality of measure, balance, and restraint, which they associate with the literature of the ancient Greeks, as an excellence at which modern writers should aim. This to many of us has seemed asking us to prefer the frigid couplets of Dryden and Pope to the glorious lyrics of the early nineteenth century, and we have not been interested. But so much of our outstanding contemporary fiction and contemporary poetry seems to illustrate not liberty, but anarchy, chaos, and confusion, that the terms decorum, balance, and restraint sound positively refreshing.

Naturally the New Humanism has been variously received. Of course to H. L. Mencken it is only anathema. Mr. Grattan, editor of the volume *A Critique of Humanism*, has only antagonism expressed in terms frankly contemptuous. Rejecting without qualification the conception of "separate personality" he sees in the Humanist's position "One of the most astonishing syntheses of discredited doctrines now titillating the minds of literary folk." Some treat the whole matter facetiously as an interesting fad to flutter the minds of the club ladies. Walter Lippmann says the modern man has lost belief "that there is immortal essence presiding like a king over his appetites." He sees only fallacy in the claim that law for man is qualitative and purposive while law for thing is quantitative and deterministic.

Beard, who sees in scientific psychology and sociology an adequate basis for man's adjustment with the world, naturally has no use for a system that maintains that man has within himself an element of value and perception of value that transcends the reach of science. On the other hand a notable group of literary critics who cannot go all the way with the Babbitt-More group thoroughly sympathize with their general aims, with their valiant opposition to outstanding evils in our intellectual life, and their effective stand for the distinctive values of personality; so, for example, G. B. Munson, Lewis Mumford in his *Modern Synthesis*, and Professor Henry Seidel Canby of Yale and

Editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, in an extended discussion of *The Critique of Humanism*. These gentlemen, after wholehearted approval of certain essential principles of the New Humanists, point out what to them are serious deficiencies. Prominent among these defects are a failure to understand, appreciate, and sympathize with their age, and the assumption that a type of culture articulated to the ancient society of Greece is adequate for present society. They repeatedly urge that so much vitally affecting human society has happened since Socrates and Aristotle, that it is futile for us to attempt to adopt the old Greek conception of the balanced life. Professor Mather of Princeton answers that this objection is valid only on the assumption that what has happened has essentially changed human nature, and this he declares has not been the case. Another major objection urged against the New Humanists is their indiscriminating hostility to emotion, a hostility which extends not only to Romantic poetry but to Humanitarianism. The good life, the critics of Humanism tell us, is many-sided, good for various ends, esthetic and emotional as well as ethical; it cannot be secured simply by an inner check, disciplining the emotion, however much recreant emotions need disciplining.

Mr. O. W. Firkin has contributed a very sane and sympathetic summary of the controversy. He deplores the hostile spirit shown by many critics of the New Humanism. "Instead," he says, "of facing a handful of able and sincere men, bravely coping with a situation of unprecedented difficulty, they have seen nothing but a knot of blunders and a train of fallacies." After expressing sympathy with certain specific criticisms, he adds, "I believe that the future belongs to the spirit that lies behind the New Humanism." Its three strong points he gives as independence of the spirit, inwardness, and discipline.

Professor William Lyon Phelps's comment is practically all favorable. He remarks picturesquely that "A fearful intellectual row is coming during the next few years," that the fight is for "the most precious possession of mankind, the Human Soul." He sees in the movement an attack on those two prime supporters of Giant Despair, the mechanistic and the naturalistic theories.

Thus far our discussion has concerned issues upon which most New Humanists are agreed. How is their campaign related to religion? The religious attitudes, beliefs, and affiliations of the in-

dividuals concerned are various. Of course in defending the integrity and freedom of the human spirit they are defending a primary basis to any essentially theistic position. If man is merely one of the infinitesimal animals inhabiting a world that is an infinitesimal speck in a vast universe, for him to claim for himself cosmic significance is the height of presumption; religion would be a transparent illusion. If on the other hand we have reason to see in human personality an autonomous element transcending the naturalistic and mechanistic, with its own laws and values determined from within, we have not only a chance of escaping the clutches of Giant Despair in our mundane relations, but we may be justified in so interpreting our own spiritual experiences and those of our contemporaries and predecessors as to attain to a faith in a personal relationship between ourselves and supreme reality. The transcendent issue in human thinking to-day is that of personality, human and divine, and here our Humanist friends are working in the right direction.

The New Humanists recognize man's life as lived on three planes: the naturalistic, the human, and the divine. As humanists they are primarily concerned with the second of these planes, the human, and with validating its differentiation from the naturalistic. They recognize that whatever convictions they may attain as to the supernatural, will articulate with and reenforce their convictions as to human values. Some individually are agnostic as to dogmatic or institutional Christianity. Others, especially those of Anglican or Roman Catholic faith, consider humanism as confirmatory of or supplementary to their religion. Professor Mather, occupying an agnostic position regarding supernatural religion, thinks that if ecclesiastical organizations maintain their position, they will be the allies of Humanism; and that if they do not, Humanism will be able independently to maintain the distinctively human values. Paul Elmer More after for years maintaining an agnostic position has concluded that that position is untenable and has passed on to a mystic form of Christianity and connected himself with the Anglican Church. Professor Babbitt has become more and more sympathetic toward supernaturalism but has not definitely accepted dogmatic Christianity. At any rate he has gone far enough to lead the agnostic Mather to say that the two outstanding leaders of the New Humanism have abandoned the agnostic position.

Those who think of Humanism as emphasizing the human in contrast with the divine may interpret the course of these two most con-

spicuous leaders as a failure of Humanism. Others will see in the experience of these two men evidence that the natural tendency of the recognition of the values of human personality is to lead one toward a more and more complete recognition of the supernatural. Mr. Babbitt as well as Mr. More maintains that Humanism needs Religion more than Religion needs Humanism.

The Roman Catholic who finds infallible authority in the Church as an organization, and those Protestants who find similar *external* authority in an infallible Book may be relatively indifferent toward this movement. To the increasing number of Protestants, however, who think of the authority of the Book as intimately connected with their personal spiritual experience, such a movement must, I think, assume greater importance.

And now a word of summary and conclusion. I do not by any means consider that the group of men who designate themselves as New Humanists have in the field of literary criticism produced any panacea for our literary ills; but the movement does show a tendency on the part of younger as well as older critics to voice vigorous protest against the anarchy of form and futility of content characterizing much of our recent poetry and prose. Much less do I believe that they have a panacea for the current anarchy and despair in ethical thinking. But it is significant that these critics, without primary theological or religious objectives, have recognized the slough into which much of the most advanced recent thinking has led or is leading, that they have so soundly diagnosed the sources of the confusion, and have suggested fundamental changes in point of view as essential to escape. They stand for the autonomy of personality as over against naturalism. They challenge the competency of the methods of the physical sciences to pass upon human values. They stand for the freedom of the will, and the possibility and moral necessity of that will's exercising a disciplinary activity over the lower impulses of our animal nature, and subduing external environment to its own ends. These principles are, I believe, essential not only for our escape from literary and ethical anarchy but also for a basis for consistent religious thinking.

I therefore consider the sudden rise of such widespread interest in the discussion of these principles among our intellectuals as a sign that the naturalistic tide is turning and that we are approaching the end of a period of dominantly naturalistic thinking.

IMAGINATION AND REALITY

Imagination and reality! Are there any two terms that ordinarily suggest more strikingly contrasting conceptions? In fact there is much to justify such an impression. People in normal physical condition except for some slight indisposition get the notion that they are desperately ill and take to their beds, later, perhaps when the house is afire or a burglar is trying to force admittance, discovering that their bodies are admirably functioning mechanisms. King Leontes with the germs of jealousy in his system broods over some entirely innocent and natural remark of his loyal spouse until he has created a vast, intricate, hideous pipe-dream, making him utterly blind to fact and reason, and filling him with murderous rage.

And how imagination ministers to and is stimulated by superstition! We recall James Whitcomb Riley's delightful picture of the little boy who is "seein' things at night." There are the imagined phenomena that led to tragic persecution of so-called witches, not primarily in our New England, but to a vastly greater extent in the Old Country. Then consider the Negroes' belief in ghosts. An employer was expressing doubt as to some of his colored laundress's convictions regarding "ghostsies." She countered somewhat in this fashion: "Now you-all can't see ghostsies but I can. Some folks is bawn to see ghostsies and some folks ain't. Them what's bawn with a caul can see ghostsies, and them what ain't can't."

An unregulated and perverted use of one of the rarest gifts of imagination—the power to bring vividly into consciousness pictures of the future—is often a source of delusion and distress. The mind is allowed to dwell on unfavorable possibilities, not as a means of forestalling them but with an exaggerated hopeless brooding that paralyzes the will and darkens the whole mental horizon. Of course this is to be distinguished from a wise foresight that visualizes possible difficulties with a view to avoiding them, a sort of telescope whereby the mariner sees the reef ahead and steers his craft into unobstructed waters.

What we are now considering is a sort of no-man's-land, the neutral zone between the unreal and the real in the visions which imagina-

tion gives. And even when her telescope discloses the real she may bring hopelessness and distress. This is the price we must pay for her good gifts. The rudder may be broken and the sails carried away by the wind that is driving the ship irremediably upon the rocks, but then the wise course is to lay down the telescope and adjust the life-preserver,—if one is available.

But in that field which some regard as most real and practical, that of the physical sciences, imagination plays no mean part. Quite as important as that patient investigation which we often associate with the scientific method, is that bold leap which creative imagination takes from the springboard of a slight hint, out over the misty deep of the unknown, to land, perhaps on an unstable island of driftwood and perhaps upon a hitherto undiscovered continent—in other words, a new scientific hypothesis.

The agency of the imagination in all the creative arts is too familiar to need elaboration. By this agency the architect can visualize in its every detail a building combining for its situation and use a degree of beauty and utility previously unattained. And so with all the creative arts—sculpture, painting, poetry, music—all depend primarily for achievement upon creative imagination; and most of those whose opinion is worth considering would classify these achievements as belonging to the domain of the real. In fact reality apprehended and interpreted by imagination some would accept as a comprehensive definition of art.

Furthermore, not only the production but the intelligent appreciation of these objects requires a certain measure of this power of imagination, and surely the satisfaction that such appreciation brings to the human spirit should be assigned to the domain of reality.

We have been noticing the connection of imagination with increasingly non-material if not intangible forms of reality. There is a further important step to be taken in this direction.

Keats has said that "Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter." This is an exceptionally melodious line, but what does the poet mean? There is evidently a contrast between two sorts of melodies, or the same melodies under different circumstances. The expression "heard melodies" gives no difficulty. To the ear naturally or by cultivation attuned to sweet sounds they give exquisite delight. It may be the mocking-bird at night or the thrush by day; it may be a song from the lips and heart of a loved one or an aria enshrining

the consummate art of a prima donna; it may be the vibrant soul-stirring notes of a violin or a cello in the hands of a master, or it may be the manifold and overwhelming tide from a great orchestral or choral ensemble.

But how about the unheard melodies? We have here the claim that the imagination reproducing or combining selections from the storehouse of memory can bring to the sensitive soul a music whose sweetness surpasses that apprehended directly by the ear.

This may seem an extravagant claim. Can we discover any supporting considerations?

For one thing, heard melodies are subject to the limitations of time and space and of manifold conditions, physical, social, and personal. This to a certain extent is true even since the advent of victrola and radio of which Keats could not even dream. The music-lover's first hour under the spell of a great orchestra may have been an epochal experience; but as an appeal to the ear it vanished with the hour. An orchestra to-day can bring no such revealing experience, yet through the imagination the original impression may be brought into consciousness.

Perhaps in the long ago one has heard from lips even then dear a song of quaint romance. With passing years the personality of the singer has for the hearer become invested with fold on fold of richest associations and then the lips to mortal ears have been stilled. As the song presents itself to the ear of the imagination it brings harmonies and overtones unperceived and unperceivable at the time of the first hearing.

We may notice further that the term "melodies" is not to be taken as applying narrowly and exclusively to what we understand by music. It may stand for any enriching experience which time, place, and sense have brought us, and the impressions of which have been filed away in the cabinet of memory.

Note Wordsworth's frequent reference to nature impressions recalled in tranquillity.

And note Coleridge's ode where he, personally altogether unhappy in mood and circumstances, by imagination transports himself to the garden of Boccaccio, where all is brightness and joy.

This perpetuation or recreation or even enhancement of experience through imagination is closely connected with the idea of the timelessness of the good, the true, and the beautiful. Abt Vogler sits at the

organ extemporizing as fingers and mood direct. He is led on and on until he reaches a previously unattained wealth of harmony. The ecstasy passes and the organist grieves that the marvelous chords have vanished never to be restored. But the suggestion that such beauty has perished seems preposterous and the artist rises to the conception that beauty once attained is timeless.

Keats, contemplating the lovers depicted on an ancient Greek vase, reflects that for two thousand years they in youthful beauty have been gazing into each other's eyes. The creative imagination of the artist has immortalized them.

The idea thus suggested and symbolized has manifold application. It is at any rate a pleasing faith, that "there is not one lost good." That whatever of real value emerges from the universal welter, emerges into the realm of the timeless,—at least has a timeless significance. And it is the imagination that rescues these values for consciousness.

This point of view may make a tremendous difference in our outlook. One has said in effect that the bitterest side of adversity is the recollection of past prosperity. Present lack brings keener pangs by contrast with former wealth. Yes, if that wealth was of the dross that perishes. But suppose that wealth was of the abiding sort,—that is, suppose it consisted of essentially abiding values.

The zest and vividness of blind Milton's descriptions of natural beauty would indicate that the eye of his imagination could at will survey entrancing landscapes and the varied charm of tree and flower, of beast and man.

Suppose one's wealth was that of worthy achievement. That abides. Suppose it included close intimate friendships with congenial comrades, personalities so attuned that formal sentences were hardly necessary to convey subtlest meanings. Of course as they one by one pass from sight and hearing, we cannot help missing them, but we need not stop with Tennyson's " 'Tis better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all"; we can by imagination summon into consciousness those expressive countenances and gracious words that were the media of our timeless fellowship. And thus those who were closer and dearer to us than whatever the word *friend* suggests—when they withdraw behind the veil, loneliness need not be all or even the major part of our experience. The more intimate and precious the fellowship was, especially if memory is reenforced and supplemented by the written word, preserving unmodified the original medium of soul con-

tact, the more material the imagination has to impress us with the immortality of life's richest values.

So far I have used the terms "timeless" and "immortal" as indicating a sort of absoluteness of value that transcends the limitations of time and place, and not with specific reference to personal survival, a conception usually implicated with our ideas of time and place. The two types of immortality approach each other harmoniously. The time and place conception of the survival life has become increasingly difficult, and yet we are so constituted that it is difficult to escape it. In the thought here suggested we have the past experiences of this earthly life lifted into an absolute here and now. Without elaboration, I suggest that we may think of the survival life as belonging to a similar here and now, so that the two types of timeless fellowship intermingle in thought.

This reference to the survival life is but a parenthetical suggestion. Returning to our earthly experience, we may be asked what this imaginative experience has to do with reality. Well, that depends on what we mean by reality. If by reality we mean only that which at a particular time appeals to us through the senses, we may be straying from the real, and by the way, into what an unsubstantial dream that sort of reality dissolves when we really try to corner it in thought. If on the other hand we find the truest reality in the experience of the soul it is another matter. Not a few believe that it is through the imagination that man draws nearest to an apprehension of reality.

But, some one may ask, is not experience such as we have been considering individual and non-social? Might not the same query be raised in connection with all those satisfactions arising from the direct apprehension of beauty,—the heard melodies as well as the unheard?

The same indictment might be brought against the purely intellectual activities that have no apparent practical goal. The exercise of man's highest and most distinctive powers are felt to be an essential good apart from its office in expanding and enriching his nature. Sane altruism only in exceptional cases demands the immolation of the individual. Even the Christ admonished us to love our neighbor as *ourselves*. The expanded and enriched life is to be sought not for self alone but is to be, so far as possible, shared with our fellows, and only that which is attained can be shared.

SENTIMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL VALUE

It may be a matter of interest to consider the relative importance of those values which we call practical and those which we group under the term *sentiment*.

What do we mean by *sentiment*? I suppose it is included in the domain of pleasure if we take the term *pleasure* in its most inclusive sense, but of course we do not include under sentiment the primary sensations, the direct responses to food, drink, or sex, nor are we thinking of the experiences generated by drugs or alcoholic stimulants.

It is something apart from the esthetic sense. The joy that comes to the sensitive spirit from the apprehension of manifold forms of the beautiful involves subtle and complicated questions with which philosophers and poets have concerned themselves. In many cases they have felt that in the esthetic experience the soul by mystic insight has come into immediate contact with reality. However we may philosophize, we may be thrilled as we look through shimmering lace-work of fluttering leaves, played upon by breeze and sunlight, and see, beyond, receding masses of mountain with shades of green and purple, varying with distance and the play of cloud and shadow, and experience a similar thrill when we stand on the shore of old ocean on a sunny, windy day and see the glistening white masses of foam and the hues shading off into the translucent, almost black purples farther out.

No, this apprehension of the beautiful is something different from what we are designating as sentiment, but is related to it, and may induce it. The impression which we receive from the splendid symmetry of the Craggy Dome and the symphonies of color playing over its sides is esthetic; but when we are inspired by its massiveness and by the thought that it is one of the highest summits in Eastern America, we are in the field of sentiment. Likewise, we are in the realm of sentiment when we look at High Top and reflect that our eyes are fixed upon a spot to which in recent decades thousands of earnest Christian youth have climbed, in many cases seeing in the ascent a symbol of the spiritual and social achievement to which they aspired.

Even more certainly than in the case of esthetics do we hold that

the emotion associated with religious experience springs from the apprehension of reality. Yet growing out of the religious experience, distinct from it, yet articulated with it, is a field of sentiment. Recently I sat in the audience room of the church of my boyhood and youth, those unforgettable formative years. The room was in general unchanged. There were the same noble proportions, the same general arrangement, the same massive, beautiful walnut pews and pulpit. All changes were in the direction of harmonious beautification, beautiful glass in the windows, new carpets and cushions, chastely pannelled walls. All was pervaded with an atmosphere of serene harmonious beauty. All that appealed to the outer eye induced a feeling of serenity, supplying an emotional background favorable to worship. This is but a single example of how there may be an emotional link or bridge between the esthetic as represented by architecture and music on the one hand, and religion on the other.

But on the particular occasion in question it was the inner eye that made the richest contribution. The room was thronged with eloquent associations, bringing to mind vital and determining experiences, and the personalities and personal influence of kindred, of pastors, of Sunday-School superintendents and teachers, and other choice spirits, all now departed from the earthly scene. The experience in and of itself was of a value impossible to estimate in terms of the practical and surely it belonged to the field of sentiment.

Thus far I have avoided the terms sentimental and sentimentalism, which in general have unfavorable connotation. They suggest an over emphasis of emotion, emotion out of proportion with the experiences lying behind it, or emotion artificially generated for its own sake without essential articulation with any significant experience. A classic example is the melancholy Jaques in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*. Jaques gloats over the emotion of melancholy. He will create or imagine situations that stimulate tears. The situations and the subjects concerned are of no interest to him except as they serve to generate an emotion that is valued for its own sake. The king in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, probably written at about the same time as *As You Like It*, presents a similar situation. He at least imagines himself in love and is thoroughly enjoying the traditional and conventional lover's woes. We find him exhorting musicians to repeat certain strains that he finds have the effect of increasing his exquisite pang!

The late eighteenth century novel is characterized as sentimental. Readers gloated over stories that would vicariously stir their emotions, especially such as would induce tearful sympathy. Many of the admired situations would now stir contemptuous laughter. Of course it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between legitimate sentiment and disparaged sentimentality. Different periods and different individuals judge differently. The catholic minded reader of today will find situations in the novels of Dickens that fall, some on one side and some on the other side of the line. Others will find little in Dickens to approve. In general I think of sentimentalism as emotion that is exaggerated or artificial, induced for its own sake without particular interest in the experiences occasioning the emotion; and of legitimate sentiment as emotion which may be thought of as the efflorescence or overtones of experiences regarded by the subject as significant in and of themselves.

With these illustrations and distinctions in mind, let us further consider specifically some of the sentiments which may be regarded as legitimate individual values. Among these, love of home is prominent. The homing instinct we find deeply rooted in even sub-human nature. The bird after migrations of thousands of miles returns to its native haunts. The carrier pigeon, released, speeds tirelessly over land and sea to one particular spot guided by a mysterious instinct. Almost unbelievable stories are told of the dog and the cat successfully overcoming tremendous obstacles to return to the spot from which circumstances have divorced them. Here we have a deep ingrafted instinct doubtless articulated with age-long activities and experiences that have contributed to ancestral survival.

Doubtless the experiences of primitive man have made similar contributions. For the youthful homo habitually to stray back to the parental cave would certainly contribute to survival. Similarly the adult by following the same habit would be less likely to encounter his rival's club. It is quite conceivable that this home-loving instinct should sometimes have disastrous consequences. It might lead beast, bird, or primitive man back into the power of foes that otherwise would be escaped. If the possessor of a coveted garment or implement is sure to be found habitually in the same cave, the envious rival will know where to surprise him.

For man in more advanced stages of culture the love of home likewise has its social and individual advantages and disadvantages.

It tends to individual contentment and hence to communal serenity. To the impartial observer there may be little to choose between the individual huts in the group, but if to the constructor and occupier each stick and each bit of thatch represents his personal choice and activity, if the various openings are a little to this side or to that for some specific reason appealing to him, and if he has become so accustomed to specific inconveniences that he no longer notices them, he has a satisfaction that gives him a sense of superiority over his neighbor. If his neighbor's dwelling is really superior, a home-loving spirit will keep him from envy.

On the other hand, too great contentment with one's surroundings may check the spirit of enterprise and the pioneering impulse, and when separations are inevitable the pangs of nostalgia are the price paid for too great attachment to home.

But to many of us today it is not primarily a matter of the historical origin of the sentiment or its practical consequences. It is one of the essential values of the individual life. To the individual it is largely a matter of association. The material objects of the home and its surroundings have become intimately associated with manifold experiences. Of course we recognize that the strength of the sentiment varies widely with the temperament of the individual and the duration and the character of the experiences.

We may use the term "home" in a narrower or a broader sense. As we consider the concentric circles surrounding the individual dwelling, we have what we call local patriotism. James Russell Lowell was conspicuous among those who have given literary expression to this sentiment. One Cambridge mansion was his home from birth till death, excepting, of course, various professional and diplomatic excursions. In his *Indian Summer Reverie* and elsewhere he has given eloquent expression to the sentiment of local patriotism. One thinks of Whittier's *Snow Bound* and Holmes' *Saturday Night Club* in the same connection. Burns's *Cotter's Saturday Night* pictures local patriotism undisturbed, and Goldsmith's *Deserted Village*, the same sentiment tragically violated. The local element is emotionally so prominent in Tennyson's *In Memoriam* that the entire tone of an important transitional passage is determined by the circumstance of the author's removal from the surroundings hallowed by the experiences previously narrated.

Then there is the sentiment connected with places associated with

famous characters and events. Of course, when we stand where a momentous event has taken place, we may realize the circumstances more vividly, if not more intelligently, and so consider the matter rather one of intellect than of sentiment. There is indeed reciprocal action, yet we may believe that sentiment quickens apprehension quite as much as apprehension rouses sentiment. Consider, for instance, Lowell's ode, *Under the Old Elm*. In imagination the reader is on the very spot where a supremely significant personality took part in an act of primary significance for American History. The local association rouses his emotions, and the emotion vivifies his realization of the event. This is a case where sentiment is not merely a matter of individual gratification but one where it also serves an intellectual purpose. Then, stand in Independence Hall in Philadelphia and realize that here the Declaration of Independence was signed, and here the Articles of Confederation were adopted, and if you have a trace of Americanism in you, you will experience an emotional thrill that you will remember for many a day.

Something of the same sort is true in connection with the tombs of noteworthy characters. We may say that it is illogical—that there is no particular significance in the place where the mortal remains are deposited to disintegrate after life and intelligence have departed, yet the great mass of mankind are under the influence of an immemorial custom leading them to regard with honor and sentiment the graves of the departed. Is it in consequence of various beliefs in bodily resurrection? It certainly antedates the Christian faith. Witness the tombs of Egypt. Witness the vast collections that have been taken from the graves of prehistoric Etruria. Witness the objects Schliemann secured from ancient Mycene. "Bury me not in Egypt," the dying Jacob is reported as saying to Joseph. Do we somehow imagine that there is a sort of identity between the personality and the lifeless form that persists in spite of physical disintegration? Whatever be the source, psychological or theological, of the age-long sentiment, it for millions still persists. We may say it is illogical; but does a sentiment need to be logical to be valuable? One stands with bared head before the tomb of a Washington, a Grant, a Lee, a Dewey, a Wilson. The act is symbolic. We honor the departed great, and with the emotional quickening, experience a vivified apprehension of the greatness of the departed. In case of the Lincoln Memorial at Washington the emotion awakened by the memory of the character celebrated is

indistinguishably mingled with the esthetic response to one of the most superb examples of monumental art produced by the brain and hand of man.

We might indefinitely enumerate places which inspire sentiment from their associations with notable characters or events.

Much that I have said in connection with the eminent departed applies to the undistinguished as well. There are conventional and often illogical ways of showing respect, affection, honor, for our departed friends. Ultra-conservatism practically always and everywhere is shown in dealing with funerals and weddings. Unnecessary and unwise expense and display are often and justly criticized. Who is to draw the line? Recently in a country cemetery I saw a grave well-nigh covered with beautiful fresh flowers. Inspection showed that the grave was one of a woman several years dead, but the day in question, as indicated by the monument, was her birthday. Evidently the family by these decorations were expressing their loving remembrance of the one who was gone. Surely the loving remembrance was commendable. Probably the family found emotional satisfaction in thus symbolizing it. Should they rather have sent these flowers to the ill, or given the equivalent of their value to the poor? Perhaps, but one recalls the words of Jesus when Mary was rebuked for wasting the valuable ointment in symbolizing her devotion.

How about love and friendship? Can we distinguish between satisfaction accompanying the contact of congenial spirits and what we are calling the values of sentiment? Cicero and Bacon are only two of the multitude who have dealt with the rewards of friendship. It is a truism that these rewards include not merely the various phases of mutual helpfulness—material support, words of commendation or apology addressed to others, and frank, disinterested counsel—but the direct spiritual satisfaction from the association of personalities possessing mutual understanding, confidence, esteem, and affection. Here direct experience, and sentiment seem inextricably fused. The element of sentiment becomes somewhat more distinct where regard is expressed by some token, the significance of which is primarily symbolical. A birthday or the anniversary of some event of common emotional interest receives appropriate and distinctive recognition,—a spoken or written word, a book, a picture, an ornament, a blossom. To giver and recipient alike the significance is not in the value or usefulness of the object but in the sentiment that it symbolizes. I

wonder how many of you have found your eyes moistening from sympathetic emotion as you have read O. Henry's *Gift of the Magi*. In one of Mr. Browning's poems addressed to his still living wife he expresses the desire to dedicate to her a type of poem different from any that he had produced for the world, saying by way of illustration that if the moon loved, it would desire to turn to the loved one the side that the world had never seen.

In these cases the element of mutuality is directly present as it is not where the arch isolater, Death, has separated those who love. Mr. Browning is again relevant with the exquisite dedications and other apostrophes that he addressed to Mrs. Browning as the years went by after her decease. And we have no reason to see anything morbid in the exquisite lyrics with which Tennyson celebrated the anniversaries of the death of his intimate friend Arthur Hallam, nor in his statement that he would rather die than foresee a day when he could with indifference regard their love. To Tennyson the cherishing of the memory of his love for Hallam was not an occasion of despair but of hope. His conviction that "Love's too precious to be lost" became the tap-root of his faith in personal immortality. Nor was the effect un-social or antisocial. For him Hallam came to be the symbol of the man that was to be, and the realization of Hallam's ideals not only the desirable but the possible goal of social achievement.

Of course the sentiment perpetuating the experiences of severed relationships may be morbid and antisocial. Shakespeare in *Twelfth Night* has presented a woman who has so persistently devoted herself to the memory of her deceased brother that she permits that memory to absorb her entire interest to the exclusion of other normal activities and relationships. Our recently deceased American bard, E. A. Robinson, has in a poem, *Avenel Gray*, presented a similar case. Such excesses should not blind us to the fact that in connection with severed relationships there may be entirely wholesome sentiment ranking with the individual's choicest values. A slender circlet of gold may, under certain circumstances, have more value for an individual than a chest of bullion or the artistry of Renaissance goldsmiths, and a single dried and faded blossom more value than the gorgeous products of royal gardens.

Life has many sorts of values. Material values have their proper place. So do intellectual values, where the authority of logic is supreme. There are social values and individual values, for is not

society made up of individuals? Of individual values few if any are more satisfying than the values of sentiment which we have been considering. Usually they have originated in social values, and furthermore are often still articulated with social or intellectual values. I maintain that even when they are merely the overtones or the efflorescence of social or intellectual values they have legitimate place, of course kept in balance with social good and with the other essential good of the individual.

RESPECT AND DISRESPECT FOR LAW

A good while ago, in studying the social and political life of antiquity, I became convinced that profound respect for law as law on the part of the great body of the citizenship was a prime essential for the perpetuity of democratic or republican institutions.

Where the authority behind law is the freely expressed will of the citizens—even of a majority of the citizens—it seems natural that the individual citizen should think of himself as in a sense master of the law, even when he happens to be in the minority. Of what meat have these his fellow citizens eaten that they should presume to dictate to his sovereign will? It is natural that the individual should stand in awe of a long entrenched ruling class; it is not as natural for Smith and Jones to stand in awe of an ordinance that depends for its validity on the fact that a few more Smiths and Joneses favored it than those who were opposed.

Political institutions, like practically all other human institutions, tend to oscillate between contrasting extremes. One form or type that has, perhaps, functioned satisfactorily, develops such abuses or defects that men turn from it toward a contrasting type. When in turn this has been carried to an extreme, it is rejected for something in the opposite direction. This seems to be the practice of the human animal in all departments of his activity.

Bryant with democratic enthusiasm sings of the antiquity of Freedom—she is older than Tyranny. Yes, there was originally the freedom of anarchy—every man for himself and against every other man; so family against family, tribe against tribe. Then it was found that a more centralized authority, while securing order, could secure more real freedom and power for the individual, and petty kingships arose. At this stage we find the early city governments of Athens and Rome. Then as kings became oppressive, city republics appeared and for a time functioned successfully. Later all sorts of disorders and excesses developed. At Rome a Clodius or his like would hire a band of strong arm men and further personal interests by direct methods including murder and arson. Upon the breakdown of existing authority, it is not strange that the practically autocratic power of the Caesars was

welcomed. In the career of Mussolini a certain parallel may be seen.

So I return to my initial statement: my study of popular government in antiquity led me to conclude that *political morality*—respect on the part of the mass of the citizens for the regularly expressed will of the community—is a prime requisite for the perpetuity of popular government. From this point of view let us consider some of the appalling forms of lawlessness in this country and their bearing upon our duty as citizens and on the prospects of our American Republic.

Account, to be sure, should be taken of certain extenuating circumstances. In comparing our country with others as to respect for law, we should remember the tradition of pioneer conditions—frontier conditions when population was scattered and the mechanism for securing and enforcing order was incomplete; besides, our population has transplanted not a single homogeneous tradition, but many various traditions from many ancestral lands. Why should we not have a spirit of restless, independent, even rebellious individualism, seeing that we are descended from the discontented, ambitious, rebellious sons of the old settled stocks?

In our surprise that with the passage of the decades the effects of pioneer and immigrant restlessness seem still to be with us, we should perhaps remind ourselves that we have shared with the rest of the western world in the general post-War social and ethical dislocation. It is claimed that in Europe there has been since the War marked increase in certain forms of lawlessness.

Yet with all palliating allowances, I believe that the present reign of organized lawlessness, the vast and intricate structure of crime that undoubtedly exists in many American cities today, together with the relative indifference of the mass of American citizens constitutes a real menace to the very existence of our institutions.

One conspicuous and complicated form of lawlessness is associated with the term racketeering. We hear how various organized groups or associations offer, for a consideration, to men engaged in a particular business, protection against the competition of rivals, and how the rejection of such an offer subjects the business man to the peril of various forms of violence. For instance, the proprietor of an automobile parking establishment is offered, for a consideration, a monopoly of the parking of his neighborhood. If he accepts, cars parked with his competitors or in the open mysteriously suffer various injuries.

If the proprietor refuses the offer, his own establishment and the cars of his patrons similarly suffer. Appeal for police protection is a dubious measure, as the officers who are supposed to protect the innocent are often in collusion with the guilty.

An interesting example, not without ironic humor, is reported from Chicago. A group of cleaning and pressing concerns, being compelled by cut-rate competitors to reduce rates unpleasantly, employed a racketeering "Association" to discourage rivals from continuing business. The contract was carried out. Cars were wrecked, drivers were slugged, suits were ruined by having acid thrown on them, and clothing was stolen from the unprotected shops. When the racketeers got the situation sufficiently in hand, and their technique perfected, they steadily advanced their required fee, compelling the cleaners to charge their customers preposterous prices. Patrons were beginning to send their business to distant places. If the cleaners refused to meet the demands of their one-time protectors, they were subjected to the treatment that had eliminated their rivals. Finally, in desperation they appealed to the great Al Capone, who up to this time had not been operating in the cleaning and pressing line. This dignitary graciously came to the rescue, organizing a rival association with decidedly moderate fees; his tremendously ramified powers put the original association out of business. How many bombings and killings were required to do the job, we are not informed.

The examples cited indicate several groups whose activities and attitudes tend to undermine respect for law. There are the racketeers themselves, conscienceless leeches on legitimate business. Then there are the business men who voluntarily or involuntarily enter into collusion with them. Furthermore, this collusion is doubtless often motivated by the suspicion that police and even officials higher in rank have been bribed to betray the law that they have sworn to defend. In the fourth place, the vast sums at the disposal of the syndicates of bandits—resources that in Chicago alone were estimated at twenty-five million dollars—make possible the employment of the shrewdest and most expensive lawyers, who do not hesitate to prostitute their ingenuity to secure the escape of any who may happen to get into the hands of brave and honest officers. Finally, and perhaps most important, there is the relative indifference of the citizenry at large.

By referring to Chicago I would by no means imply that the

Windy City is the only scene of these lawless activities. There is too much reason to believe that our other large cities are honeycombed with similar insidious corruption. Indeed Chicago has been conspicuous for its earnest efforts to combat the evil.

Thus far we have been considering groups that levy tribute from business and industry. We are all aware that many other forms of lawlessness are common.

Violence in connection with labor troubles, especially in the building trades, is an important and complicated matter. When employer or employee resorts to violence or terrorism we have something closely approaching war, and as in other wars, one's assignment of blame may largely be determined by one's interests and sympathies. The union by a long series of negotiations and struggles has built up for its members a status giving them what they regard as only fair living conditions. A crisis arises which threatens to wreck the whole structure and reduce the members to the means of bare subsistence. Under these circumstances it would perhaps seem to them quixotic to refrain from recourse to direct action. The employer, on the other hand, resents what he considers interference with his fundamental rights, and resists demands which he may believe would make it impossible for him to continue business except at a loss. He is tempted to employ so-called private guards, really mercenary troops, or resort to other forms of illegal coercion to secure what he considers his rights. In either case we have activities that tend to impair respect for law.

Whatever be our conviction regarding the wisdom of the passage of the Volstead Act, there can be no difference of opinion as to the extent and the deplorableness of the disrespect for law which followed its passage. The Volstead Act in attempting to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment suddenly made illegal what to certain great concentrated masses of population in our cities was regarded as legitimate. It attempted abruptly to change the personal habits of millions of Americans, in many cases lawabiding citizens of native stock as well as of foreign extraction. Many resented this as an impertinence.

We may justly say that had these citizens been properly imbued with respect for law, as law, they would have acquiesced in the dictate of regularly established authority, and changed their practices accordingly; but unfortunately they were not so imbued and did not so revolutionize their practices. We know what a vast and profitable illegal business followed. Of course we could expect no compunc-

tions on the part of the bootlegger. The tragedy is in connection with the attitude of the purchaser, in complicity with the lawbreaker and morally culpable, though not himself technically a lawbreaker. Such an attitude on the part of a great mass of the citizenry toward one law can hardly fail to affect the general attitude toward all law. So prominent a leader as President Butler is reported as having said that the most effective way to repeal the Volstead Act was simply to ignore it. Just where can the limit safely be set to that sort of repeal?

Our country offers many examples of this general disrespect for law. Consider the prevalence of crimes of violence here in comparison with conditions in other civilized lands. Consider the tendency of various groups to adopt direct extra-legal methods to punish or discourage acts of which they disapprove. Consider the nonchalance of the automobilist as he boasts of having made an average of sixty or more miles an hour over roads with a legal maximum of forty-five or fifty.

All the lawless acts that we have been considering have a two-fold aspect; they are symptoms of a general disrespect for law, and they contribute to the continuance and the increase of that disrespect; the relation is reciprocal. What are some of the remedies that would counteract this dangerous tendency?

In the first place, there should be greater care in the enactment of laws. Our laws are too numerous and often ill-considered or ambiguous. Quite possibly some who fix forty-five miles as the maximum legal speed on a highway realize that under certain circumstances sixty miles an hour is safe, and assume that the driver will use his judgment in applying the ordinance. Another remedy consists in the reform of our systems of law enforcement. Our attention is frequently called to the greater efficiency, for instance, of British legal and judicial procedure. But the greatest hope of improvement in the situation lies in the attitudes and activities of those who realize the peril threatening our free institutions. They should set a wholesome example, uniformly, so far as practicable, conforming strictly to known law, excepting of course cases where conformity would violate individual conscience. Parents, teachers, and any others who have opportunity to influence the ideals and thinking of the young should reenforce their example by timely words, calling attention to the vital importance of political morality in a democ-

racy. Likewise, in all his relations, the thoughtful and patriotic American should use his influence toward the checking of a tendency that especially in times of stress threatens anarchy, which in turn, as the experience of the centuries teaches, is the natural forerunner of despotism.

SOME ADMINISTRATIVE ANALOGIES: ANCIENT AND MODERN

The thought and interest of the intelligent and patriotic citizen, especially in these troublous times, must be prominently concerned with the social and administrative problems of our nation and of the world at large. As I have in the past had occasion to give some attention to the social and political struggles and upheavals of classical antiquity, it may not be inappropriate or fruitless for me at this time to present some analogies between the past and the present.

It is a truism that everything connected with the interrelations of human personalities is exceedingly complicated. To draw significant conclusions regarding the situation of one group in one age as related to that of another group in another age may be difficult and uncertain. Various attendant circumstances differentiating the two groups may invalidate the conclusions which the analogies suggest. There is the varying respective background determined by the spirit of an age or a race; and then there is the element of outstanding personality and the reciprocal influence of the age and the man, as Emerson and Carlyle have elaborated. What would have been the history of Rome without Julius or Augustus Caesar, of the Holy Roman Empire without Charlemagne, of Britain without Alfred or William the Conqueror, or of our own America without Washington, Jefferson, or Hamilton? How is and how will be the solution of present-day world problems affected by the personal activities of a Stalin, a Mussolini, a Hitler, a Roosevelt?

Yet in spite of all these diversities there is a great substratum of common human nature that has persisted through the centuries and even millenniums, so that the experience of the past is far from negligible.

We sometimes in our modern conceit are inclined to assume that an age of the radio and the airplane, an age that can map the geography of the atom and measure the well-nigh infinitudes of the physical heavens, is similarly superior to antiquity in social and political theory and practice. But we must remember that in the case of Greece, we are dealing with a group that produced and was in-

fluenced by a Plato and an Aristotle, two of the keenest and most profound social and political thinkers who have ever lived. And in the case of Rome we must not forget the administrative genius that welded a large part of the civilized world into a political unity which an eminent authority has maintained gave the portion of humanity concerned centuries of the greatest political prosperity it has ever enjoyed. On the legal side we must remember the series of imperial jurists, who, using the fiction that they were applying to the specific cases brought before them the principles of the ancient twelve tables, built up a series of precedents that have become the direct and primary basis of the law of the Western world, the English-speaking section only excepted, there furthermore being little doubt that even the English common law was, in its development, profoundly affected by the Roman contribution.

In both Greece and Rome the original political unit was the city-state, and the earliest known form of government monarchy. To use a present-day comparison, there would not be a king of Volusia County, but a king of DeLand, Volusia County being more or less under the control of the DeLand municipal government. In both Athens and Rome, from which we will take our analogies, monarchy was early modified in the direction of a republican or democratic form.

For our first analogy let us look at the New Deal instituted by Solon in 594 B. C. At this time the government of Athens was *timocracy*, in accordance with which a man's status depended upon his property. Warfare was a very important element in the citizen's activity. The equipment of the various types of soldiers required varying outlay, and each soldier provided his own equipment. The citizens were accordingly divided into four classes on the basis of income, and consequently on the type of equipment each was able to provide. Political status and power varied as between the members of these several classes.

The amount of available agricultural land about Athens was very small, and much of it was in the hands of the larger landholders. The small landholder tended to get into debt, becoming a tenant farmer, and then, mortgaging his own person, becoming a slave. Revolution was imminent. In 594 B. C., Solon, a man of noble birth, was elected to two important offices, a fact which enabled him constitutionally, by edict, to introduce important changes. He abolish-

ed all public and private debts contracted on the security of land or person, not merely effecting a moratorium but a cancellation of all farm mortgages. He freed all who had become slaves through debt, and forbade the lending of money on the security of persons. He limited the amount of land a person could own, and diminished the amount of silver in the unit of coinage, thus making the payment of debts easier. Do not some of these measures sound familiar? We are told, however, that Athens never afterwards canceled debts or debased coinage.

Furthermore, Solon promoted manufacturing so that articles might be exported in exchange for food, imposed certain sumptuary limitations on personal expenses, and finally made certain liberalizing readjustments as to the qualifications and powers of the members of the four fundamental classes. Thus we see that the essential character of the political and social structure was not changed, but such liberalizing modifications were made as to avert the impending revolution and remove the more glaring inequalities.

Yet wise as were the measures of Solon, he pleased neither of the opposing elements—he went too far for one and not far enough for the other. Likewise, we hear Mr. Roosevelt on the one hand denounced as heading straight toward socialism or communism, and on the other as being an essential fascist, working for the entrenchment of capitalism.

While the Athenian constitution grew gradually more democratic, there emerged from time to time the interesting phenomenon of the tyrant—the individual who seized and exercised unconstitutional and autocratic powers. Sometimes a party leader, defeated in a contest conducted by constitutional methods, instead of yielding to the verdict of the voters would, with popular or military support, seize autocratic power.

If there was a real crisis which the developing democracy was unequal to meeting, the tyrant might really advance the public welfare. Such was the case of Pisistratus, whose rule, together with that of his son Hippias, extended from 560 B. C. to 510 B. C., but even in such cases the temptation of unlimited power in time led to abuses that caused all benefits to be forgotten. Where the tyrant was simply a disgruntled politician, bribing the populace with empty promises, he was likely to use his power primarily to slaughter his enemies and entrench himself. Such was the rule of The Thirty

about 400 B. C. Obtaining power as a temporary committee to revise the constitution, they made themselves absolute masters of the state. At first killing those who were recognized as menaces to the common good, they were accepted as benefactors; but later they launched out on a course of ruthless and selfish slaughter that provoked their overthrow.

We are reminded that Hitler came into power as the professed leader of a liberal, moderately socialistic constituency, but has veered to the support of capital and big business. It will be interesting to see how long he can hold his position after forsaking his throng of liberal supporters.

Reference to the excesses of Athenian tyrants suggests the excesses of the Athenian democracy. Increasing power was granted to the great popular assemblies. The Athenian populace was highly emotional and decidedly susceptible to the appeal of eloquent and clever orators. Accordingly, hasty, unwise, and even ruthless action was not infrequent. Our fathers supposed that they had established a representative republic. In the election of President, the nomination of United States senators, and in various other ways we have traveled far in the direction of democracy. We have been inclined to regard this as unqualified progress and improvement. We have trusted the calm disinterested intelligence of our citizenship to reach wise and salutary decisions. We have believed that modern means of communication would weld widely distributed hosts of voters into real unities without their being exposed to the brain storms of mob psychology that often swayed the assemblies of ancient city democracies. But can we be sure of such exemption? A nation-wide chain of jingo journals supplemented by nation-wide radio broadcasts of clever orators might conceivably have an effect not essentially different from that of the magnetic, loud-voiced demagogue with an Athenian assembly. It would be interesting to know in the case of our entrance into the Spanish-American and the World War the relative influence of the deliberate judgment of the respective administrations and the waves of popular emotion from the sinking of two American ships. One wonders what would be the consequences of the sinking under ambiguous circumstances of one of our ships in the Pacific.

So much for Athens; how about Rome?

Here, as in the case of Athens, we have a city monarchy over-

thrown in the dim dawn of history. The founders of the Roman republic, like our own American forebears, depended on checks and balances to prevent the return of autocracy. Instead of a single executive, there were two consuls with equal power, so that one could veto an act of the other; they held office for but a year, and after the expiration of their term were responsible for their official conduct. The senate represented the interests of the leading families of the city, but their powers and influence were counterbalanced by that of various councils, assemblies, and magistrates. It is evidence of the practical political efficiency of the Romans that those checks and balances did not stall the machinery of government, but they did not. There was, however, an emergency appliance, the possession of which would have saved the Athenians much trouble. In situations particularly needing prompt, unified action, a dictator with practically absolute power might be appointed, but his term of office was limited to six months. Thus as long as the republican machinery functioned, the Romans escaped anything like the entrenched autocracy of a Lenin, a Stalin, a Mussolini, or a Hitler. We here see an analogy to the flexibility of our own constitution which, during the present emergency, permits, under congressional control, the special powers of the executive.

The Roman government which I have outlined was developed in, by, and for a community consisting of a city and its immediate surroundings, and for centuries it functioned fairly well. General conditions, however, were gradually and radically changing. And in this matter of adjustment to changing conditions we may, perhaps, find instructive analogies.

As in Athens, Roman agricultural land gravitated into the hands of large landholders. This applied not only to the fields in the immediate vicinity of the city, but as surrounding districts gradually came under Roman control, land seized by the conquerors fell into the hands of the nobles and the wealthy. The labor on the farms and in industry was largely performed by slaves. Slave labor, therefore, had something of the same tendency to promote unemployment among the unpropertied freemen as have the economies of machine production among us.

We have seen that Roman government was originally of and by the inhabitants of the city. As conquest rapidly increased the Roman domain, citizenship was not granted to the conquered populations.

There were, therefore, inequalities not only between classes of citizens, but between the comparatively small number of citizens and the inhabitants of Rome's ever-increasing domain. Governors from the city ruling class were sent out for short terms to rule the dependent provinces. These governors made haste to enrich themselves at the expense of the provincials, and then returned to Rome to make place for greedy successors, and with their pelf to contribute to the inequality and corruption of the home town.

I say corruption, for the poor citizens had certain important voting powers which could be exercised only in person in the city assemblies. We can readily see how this unemployed mass, tending to become a rabble, would be open to all sorts of bribery from ambitious politicians. "Bread for nothing and games forever" was by no means the whole story. None in the city, high or low, were willing to give up traditionally entrenched advantages, although the conditions establishing these advantages had utterly passed away. Consequently the whole political system broke down and Rome suffered a hundred years of turmoil, revolution, and anarchy during which thousands of her citizens were killed, not only on battle fields, but in the massacres known as proscriptions.

Two high-born and high-minded brothers, Gaius and Tiberius Gracchus, made heroic efforts to remedy this situation, but both failed and perished. Later Marius, a popular leader, getting the upper hand, had thousands of the upper classes massacred; then Sulla, an aristocratic leader made a similar "purging" of influential members of the popular party. So Hitler's little operation of that sort was comparatively a trifling affair. How the Russian political victims compare in number with the Roman it is difficult to say, since the reports are so conflicting.

Finally, in Julius Caesar, Rome had a man who thoroughly understood the evils of the situation, clearly saw what needed to be done, and had the military and political genius to rebuild a tottering world. In one respect, fatal for him personally, he failed. He did what needed to be done frankly and without camouflage, conducting himself as if assuming that all recognized the desirability of the reorganization and his fitness to do the work. But justice and equality for the provinces meant that no longer could the inhabitants of one city exploit the Mediterranean world. Those who had lost power, status, or opportunity to pillage,—the envious politician and even the upright,

blindly conservative patriot, such as were Cicero and Brutus,—supported the assassination of Caesar, and Rome had to suffer another season of turmoil and bloodshed.

Particularly interesting is the position of the patriotic Brutus and Cicero, passionately devoted to the institutions of the fathers and utterly unconscious of the fact that the world making possible the working of those institutions had passed never to return. We may recognize in some present-day pleas for the old-time "rugged individualism" an analogous failure to recognize realities.

Augustus was far more diplomatic than the greater Julius. He, or his able lieutenants, worked out a compromise whereby the essential measures of Julius were retained while the shadowy form of the old institutions persisted. The senate and magistrates were permitted to go through the motions of functioning while the real power was exercised by the imperial group. The Mediterranean world was thus insured about four hundred years of relatively peaceful and efficient administration. In many respects Mussolini, in establishing and maintaining his power, has imitated the technique of his predecessor Augustus, while Hitler seems to be imitating some of Augustus' less worthy successors. It is interesting to note how frequently the autocrat who proved unworthy was removed by assassination or conspiracy. And even a Nero was more of a nuisance in the city of Rome than in the provinces. An organization had been set up that permitted the splendid administrative and judicial genius of the Romans to function independently of the foibles of some unworthy emperors.

What, then, are the more interesting analogies that this rapid glance at Athenian and Roman experience has yielded?

We have seen that there have been other than military emergencies that have caused the affairs of republics to fall into the hands of a single administrator; that early Rome had in the dictatorship a constitutional provision for such an arrangement while early Athens did not. We have seen that the Athenian tyrant who seized unconstitutional power was sometimes a wise and efficient administrator who rendered his city needed and valuable service, but that too often the tyrant was a self-seeking politician, securing power by empty promises to the unprivileged, and using it for selfish and corrupt ends, and that even the beneficent tyrant tended to deteriorate.

Further, we have seen both in the case of Athens and that of Rome how institutions naturally articulated to one set of conditions have

been out-moded, rendered to a greater or less extent obsolete by changing conditions. We have seen how a Solon was able to make the needed readjustments strictly within the constitutional framework, but how a Caesar found more radical reconstruction necessary. In Cicero we see the tragedy of the patriot who, wedded to the time-hallowed *mores* of the past, may fail to realize the significance of changing conditions.

As to the significance of recent economic and social events in relation to the permanence of changed conditions, and as to the measures that will be necessary to meet those changed conditions there is necessarily a wide diversity of opinion corresponding to diversities of temperament, experience, and interests; yet we find thoughtful men who, though differing widely in these respects, agree in recognizing that important and permanent changes are imminent.

As we look out upon this perplexed and perplexing world, may we be able to distinguish between the Solons and the demagogues, between, on the one hand, the hair-brained dreamers and self-seeking schemers and, on the other hand, the constructive statesmen of genuine insight. Let us hope that America has so much of the British spirit of adjustment to realities that she shall not, like Bourbon France or Czarist Russia, persist in blind reactionary conservatism until catastrophic explosion results, but in action as well as doctrine, "prove all things and hold fast to that which is good."

